From 4f49b16079b27d7ce633619e4cddfdf2bffbc952 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: cashmere <cashmere@autistici.org>
Date: Fri, 4 Sep 2026 09:05:24 +0200
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+# The Default Content Security Policy (CSP)
+
+When Fossil’s web interface generates an HTML page, it normally includes
+a [Content Security Policy][csp] (CSP) in the `<head>`.  The CSP specifies
+allowed sources for external resources such as images,
+CSS, javascript, and so forth.
+The purpose of CSP is to provide an extra layer of protection against
+[cross-site scripting][xss] (XSS) and code injection
+attacks.  Compatible web browsers will not use external resources unless
+they are specifically allowed by the CSP, which dramatically reduces
+the attack surface of the application.
+
+Fossil does not rely on CSP for security.
+A Fossil server should be secure from attack even without CSP.
+Fossil includes built-in server-side content filtering logic.
+For example, Fossil purposely breaks `<script>` tags when it finds
+them in Markdown and Fossil Wiki documents.  And the Fossil build
+process scans the source code for potential injection vulnerabilities
+and refuses to compile if any problems are found.
+However, CSP provides an additional layer of defense against undetected
+bugs that might lead to a vulnerability.
+
+## The Default Restrictions
+
+The default CSP used by Fossil is as follows:
+
+<pre>
+default-src 'self' data:;
+script-src 'self' 'nonce-$nonce';
+style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline';
+img-src * data:;
+</pre>
+
+The default is recommended for most installations.  However,
+the site administrators can overwrite this default CSP using the
+[default-csp setting](/help/default-csp).  For example,
+CSP restrictions can be completely disabled by setting the default-csp to:
+
+    default-src *;
+
+The following sections detail the maining of the default CSP setting.
+
+### <a id="base"></a> default-src 'self' data:
+
+This policy means mixed-origin content isn’t allowed, so you can’t refer
+to resources on other web domains. Browsers will ignore a link like the
+one in the following Markdown under our default CSP:
+
+    ![fancy 3D Fossil logotype](https://i.imgur.com/HalpMgt.png)
+
+If you look in the browser’s developer console, you should see a CSP
+error when attempting to render such a page.
+
+The default policy does allow inline `data:` URIs, which means you could
+[data-encode][de] your image content and put it inline within the
+document:
+
+    ![small inline image](...)
+
+That method is best used for fairly small resources. Large `data:` URIs
+are hard to read and edit. There are secondary problems as well: if you
+put a large image into a Fossil forum post this way, anyone subscribed
+to email alerts will get a copy of the raw URI text, which can amount to
+pages and pages of [ugly Base64-encoded text][b64].
+
+For inline images within [embedded documentation][ed], it suffices to
+store the referred-to files in the repo and then refer to them using
+repo-relative URLs:
+
+    ![large inline image](./inlineimage.jpg)
+
+This avoids bloating the doc text with `data:` URI blobs:
+
+There are many other cases, [covered below](#serving).
+
+[b64]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Base64
+[svr]: ./server/
+
+
+### <a id="img"></a> img-src * data:
+
+It was not always thus, but after careful consideration, we’ve chosen to
+leave the source of inline images unrestricted by default in Fossil.
+This allows you to pull them in from remote systems, to pull them from
+within the Fossil repository itself, or to use `data:` URIs.
+
+If you are certain all images come from only within the repository, you
+can close off certain risks — tracking pixels, broken image format
+decoders, system dialog box spoofing, etc. — by changing this to
+“`img-src 'self'`” possibly followed by “`data:`” if you will also use
+`data:` URIs.
+
+
+### <a id="style"></a> style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'
+
+This policy allows CSS information to come from separate files hosted
+under the Fossil repo server’s Internet domain. It also allows inline CSS
+`<style>` tags within the document text.
+
+The `'unsafe-inline'` declaration allows CSS within individual HTML
+elements:
+
+    <p style="margin-left: 4em">Indented text.</p>
+
+As the "`unsafe-`" prefix on the name implies, the `'unsafe-inline'`
+feature is suboptimal for security.  However, there are
+a few places in the Fossil-generated HTML that benefit from this
+flexibility and the work-arounds are verbose and difficult to maintain.
+Furthermore, the harm that can be done with style injections is far
+less than the harm possible with injected javascript.  And so the
+`'unsafe-inline'` compromise is accepted for now, though it might
+go away in some future release of Fossil.
+
+
+### <a id="script"></a> script-src 'self' 'nonce-%s'
+
+This policy disables in-line JavaScript and only allows `<script>`
+elements if the `<script>` includes a `nonce` attribute that matches the
+one declared by the CSP. That nonce is a large random number, unique for
+each HTTP page generated by Fossil, so an attacker cannot guess the
+value, so the browser will ignore an attacker’s injected JavaScript.
+
+That nonce can only come from one of three sources, all of which should
+be protected at the system administration level on the Fossil server:
+
+*   **Fossil server C code:** All code paths in Fossil that emit
+    `<script>` elements include the `nonce` attribute. There are several
+    cases, such as the “JavaScript” section of a [custom skin][cs].
+    That text is currently inserted into each HTML page generated by
+    Fossil,¹ which means it needs to include a `nonce` attribute to
+    allow it to run under this default CSP.  We consider JavaScript
+    emitted via these paths to be safe because it’s audited by the
+    Fossil developers. We assume that you got your Fossil server’s code
+    from a trustworthy source and that an attacker cannot replace your
+    Fossil server binary.
+
+*   **TH1 code:** The Fossil TH1 interpreter pre-defines the
+    [`$nonce` variable](./th1.md#nonce) for use in [custom skins][cs].  For
+    example, some of the stock skins that ship with Fossil include a
+    wall clock feature up in the corner that updates once a minute.
+    These paths are safe in the default Fossil configuration because
+    only the [all-powerful Setup user][su] can write TH1 code that
+    executes in the server’s running context.
+
+    There is, however, [a default-disabled path](#xss) to beware of,
+    covered in the next section.
+
+*   **[CGI server extensions][ext]:** Fossil exports the nonce to the
+    CGI in the `FOSSIL_NONCE` environment variable, which it can then
+    use in `<script>` elements it generates. Because these extensions
+    can only be installed by the Fossil server’s system administrator,
+    this path is also considered safe.
+
+[ext]: ./serverext.wiki
+[su]:  ./caps/admin-v-setup.md#apsu
+
+
+#### <a id="xss"></a>Cross-Site Scripting via Ordinary User Capabilities
+
+We’re so restrictive about how we treat JavaScript because it can lead
+to difficult-to-avoid scripting attacks. If we used the same CSP for
+`<script>` tags [as for `<style>` tags](#style), anyone with check-in
+rights on your repository could add a JavaScript file to your repository
+and then refer to it from other content added to the site.  Since
+JavaScript code can access any data from any URI served under its same
+Internet domain, and many Fossil users host multiple Fossil repositories
+under a single Internet domain, such a CSP would only be safe if all of
+those repositories are trusted equally.
+
+Consider [the Chisel hosting service](http://chiselapp.com/), which
+offers free Fossil repository hosting to anyone on the Internet, all
+served under the same `http://chiselapp.com/user/$NAME/$REPO` URL
+scheme. Any one of those hundreds of repositories could trick you into
+visiting their repository home page, set to [an HTML-formatted embedded
+doc page][hfed] via Admin → Configuration → Index&nbsp;Page, with this
+content:
+
+    <script src="/doc/trunk/bad.js"></script>
+
+That script can then do anything allowed in JavaScript to *any other*
+Chisel repository your browser can access. The possibilities for mischief
+are *vast*. For just one example, if you have login cookies on four
+different Chisel repositories, your attacker could harvest the login
+cookies for all of them through this path if we allowed Fossil to serve
+JavaScript files under the same CSP policy as we do for CSS files.
+
+This is why the default configuration of Fossil has no way for [embedded
+docs][ed], [wiki articles][wiki], [tickets][tkt], [forum posts][fp], or
+[tech notes][tn] to automatically insert a nonce into the page content.
+This is all user-provided content, which could link to user-provided
+JavaScript via check-in rights, effectively giving all such users a
+capability that is usually reserved to the repository’s administrator.
+
+The default-disabled [TH1 documents feature][edtf] is the only known
+path around this restriction.  If you are serving a Fossil repository
+that has any user you do not implicitly trust to a level that you would
+willingly run any JavaScript code they’ve provided, blind, you **must
+not** give the `--with-th1-docs` option when configuring Fossil, because
+that allows substitution of the [pre-defined `$nonce` TH1
+variable](./th1.md#nonce) into [HTML-formatted embedded docs][hfed]:
+
+    <script src="/doc/trunk/bad.js" nonce="$nonce"></script>
+
+Even with this feature enabled, you cannot put `<script>` tags into
+Fossil Wiki or Markdown-formatted content, because our HTML generators
+for those formats purposely strip or disable such tags in the output.
+Therefore, if you trust those users with check-in rights to provide
+JavaScript but not those allowed to file tickets, append to wiki
+articles, etc., you might justify enabling TH1 docs on your repository,
+since the only way to create or modify HTML-formatted embedded docs is
+through check-ins.
+
+[ed]:   ./embeddeddoc.wiki
+[edtf]: ./embeddeddoc.wiki#th1
+[hfed]: ./embeddeddoc.wiki#html
+
+
+## <a id="serving"></a>Serving Files Within the Limits
+
+There are several ways to serve files within the above restrictions,
+avoiding the need to [override the default CSP](#override). In
+decreasing order of simplicity and preference:
+
+1.  Within [embedded documentation][ed] (only!) you can refer to files
+    stored in the repo using document-relative file URLs:
+
+         ![inline image](./inlineimage.jpg)
+
+2.  Relative file URLs don’t work from [wiki articles][wiki],
+    [tickets][tkt], [forum posts][fp], or [tech notes][tn], but you can
+    still refer to them inside the repo with [`/doc`][du] or
+    [`/raw`][ru] URLs:
+
+         ![inline image](/doc/trunk/images/inlineimage.jpg)
+         <img src="/raw/logo.png" style="float: right; margin-left: 2em">
+
+3.  Store the files as [unversioned content][uv], referred to using
+    [`/uv`][uu] URLs instead:
+
+         ![logo](/uv/logo.png)
+
+4.  Use the [optional CGI server extensions feature](./serverext.wiki)
+    to serve such content via `/ext` URLs.
+
+5.  Put Fossil behind a [front-end proxy server][svr] as a virtual
+    subdirectory within the site, so that our default CSP’s “self” rules
+    match static file routes on that same site. For instance, your repo
+    might be at `https://example.com/code`, allowing documents in that
+    repo to refer to:
+
+    *   images as `/image/foo.png`
+    *   JavaScript files  as `/js/bar.js`
+    *   CSS style sheets as `/style/qux.css`
+
+    Although those files are all outside the Fossil repo at `/code`,
+    keep in mind that it is the browser’s notion of “self” that matters
+    here, not Fossil’s. All resources come from the same Internet
+    domain, so the browser cannot distinguish Fossil-provided content
+    from static content served directly by the proxy server.
+
+    This method opens up many other potential benefits, such as
+    [TLS encryption][tls], high-performance tuning via custom HTTP
+    headers, integration with other web technologies like PHP, etc.
+
+You might wonder why we rank in-repo content as most preferred above. It
+is because the first two options are the only ones that cause such
+resources to be included in an initial clone or in subsequent repo
+syncs. The methods further down the list have a number of undesirable
+properties:
+
+1.  Relative links to out-of-repo files break in `fossil ui` when run on
+    a clone.
+
+2.  Absolute links back to the public repo instance solve that:
+
+        ![inline image](https://example.com/images/logo.png)
+
+    ...but using them breaks some types of failover and load-balancing
+    schemes, because it creates a [single point of failure][spof].
+
+3.  Absolute links fail when one’s purpose in using a clone is to
+    recover from the loss of a project web site by standing that clone
+    up [as a server][svr] elsewhere. You probably forgot to copy such
+    external resources in the backup copies, so that when the main repo
+    site disappears, so do those files.
+
+Unversioned content is in the middle of the first list above — between
+fully-external content and fully in-repo content — because it isn’t
+included in a clone unless you give the `--unversioned` flag. If you
+then want updates to the unversioned content to be included in syncs,
+you have to give the same flag to [a `sync` command](/help/sync).
+There is no equivalent with other commands such as `up` and `pull`, so
+you must then remember to give `fossil uv` commands when necessary to
+pull new unversioned content down.
+
+Thus our recommendation that you refer to in-repo resources exclusively.
+
+[du]:   /help/www/doc
+[fp]:   ./forum.wiki
+[ru]:   /help/www/raw
+[spof]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Single_point_of_failure
+[tkt]:  ./tickets.wiki
+[tn]:   ./event.wiki
+[tls]:  ./server/debian/nginx.md 
+[uu]:   /help/www/uv
+[uv]:   ./unvers.wiki
+[wiki]: ./wikitheory.wiki
+
+
+## <a id="override"></a>Overriding the Default CSP
+
+If you wish to relax the default CSP’s restrictions or to tighten them
+further, there are multiple ways to accomplish that.
+
+The following methods are listed in top-down order to give the simplest
+and most straightforward method first.  Further methods dig down deeper
+into the stack, which is helpful to understand even if you end up using
+a higher-level method.
+
+
+### <a id="cspsetting"></a>The `default-csp` Setting
+
+If the [`default-csp` setting](/help/default-csp) is defined and is
+not an empty string, its value is injected into the page using
+[TH1](./th1.md) via one or more of the methods below, depending on the
+skin you’re using and local configuration.
+
+Changing this setting is the easiest way to set a nonstandard CSP on
+your site.
+
+Because a blank setting tells Fossil to use its hard-coded default CSP,
+you have to say something like the following to get a repository without
+content security policy restrictions:
+
+    $ fossil set -R /path/to/served/repo.fossil default-csp 'default-src *'
+
+We recommend that instead of using the command line to change this
+setting that you do it via the repository’s web interface, in
+Admin → Settings.  Write your CSP rules in the edit box marked
+"`default-csp`". Do not add hard newlines in that box: the setting needs
+to be on a single long line. Beware that changes take effect
+immediately, so be careful with your edits: you could end up locking
+yourself out of the repository with certain CSP changes!
+
+There are a few reasons why changing this setting via the command line
+is inadvisable, except for very short settings like the example above:
+
+1.  You have to be sure to set it on the repository where you want the
+    CSP to apply.  Changing this setting on your local clone doesn’t
+    affect the remote repo you cloned from, which is most likely where
+    you want the CSP restrictions.
+
+2.  For more complicated CSPs, the quoting rules for your shell and the
+    CSP syntax may interact, making it difficult or impossible to set
+    your desired CSP via the command line.  Setting it via the web UI
+    doesn’t have this problem.
+
+
+
+### <a id="th1"></a>TH1 Setup Hook
+
+Fossil sets [the TH1 variable `$default_csp`][thvar] from the
+`default-csp` setting and uses *that* to inject the value into generated
+HTML pages in its stock configuration.
+
+This means that another way you can override this value is to use
+the [`th1-setup` hook script](./th1-hooks.md), which runs before TH1
+processing happens during skin processing:
+
+    $ fossil set th1-setup "set default_csp {default-src 'self'}"
+
+After [the above](#admin-ui), this is the cleanest method.
+
+[thvar]: ./customskin.md#vars
+
+
+
+### <a id="csrc"></a>Fossil C Source Code
+
+When you do neither of the above things, Fossil uses
+[a hard-coded default](/info?ln=527-530&name=65a555d0d4fb846b).
+
+We tell you about this not to suggest that you hack the Fossil C source
+code to change the CSP but simply to document the next step before we
+move down-stack.
+
+
+
+### <a id="header"></a>Skin Header
+
+[In the normal case](./customskin.md#override), Fossil injects the CSP
+retrieved by one of the above methods into the header of all HTML
+documents it generates:
+
+```HTML
+<head>...
+  <meta http-equiv="Content-Security-Policy" content="...">
+  ...
+```
+
+Fossil skips this when you’re using a custom skin *and* its
+[Header section](./customskin.md#headfoot) includes a `<body>` tag. This
+is because prior to Fossil 2.5, the Header for a custom skin normally
+contained everything from the opening `<html>` tag through the leading
+`<body>` tag. From that version onward, Fossil now generates that header
+when possible, so that the skin’s Header normally provides only the
+opening tags of the document body, rather than the HTML header.
+
+When we added CSP support in Fossil 2.7, we made use of that mechanism
+to inject the CSP into the generated HTML document header.
+
+For backwards compatibility, Fossil skips this when the skin’s Header
+includes a `<body>` tag. Fossil takes that as a hint that it’s dealing
+with a skin made in the pre-Fossil-2.5 days and doesn’t try to blindly
+override it.
+
+The problem then is that you may be a Fossil user from the days before
+Fossil 2.5, and you may be using a custom skin. This includes users who
+selected one of the stock skins, since for the purposes of this section,
+there is no difference between the cases. If you go into Admin → Skins →
+Header and find a `<body>` tag, none of the above will apply to your
+repo since Fossil will not be injecting its CSP into your pages.
+
+If you selected one of the stock skins (e.g. Khaki) prior to upgrading
+to Fossil 2.5+ and didn’t make any changes to it since that time, you
+can take the simplest option, which is to simply revert to the stock
+version of the skin, so your pages will have the CSP injected, at which
+point this document will begin describing what Fossil does with that
+repo.
+
+If you’re using a customized version of one of the stock skins, the
+skinning mechanism has a diff feature to make it easier to fold your
+local changes into the stock version.
+
+If you’re using a fully customized skin, we recommend replicating the
+method that [the Bootstrap skin uses][dcinj].² Alone among the stock
+Fossil skins, Bootstrap still does old-style Header processing,
+providing the entire HTML header and the start of the document body.
+
+We do *not* recommend injecting an explicit `Content-Security-Policy`
+meta tag into a header to override Fossil’s default CSP. That means you
+have to edit the skin every time you want to change the CSP. Use the TH1
+`$default_csp` variable like the Bootstrap skin does so you can use one
+of the methods above with your custom skin, so the CSP can vary
+independently of the skin.
+
+[dcinj]: /info?ln=7&name=bef080a6929a3e6f
+
+
+### <a id="fep"></a>Front-End Proxy
+
+If your Fossil repo is behind some sort of HTTP [front-end proxy][svr],
+the [preferred method][pmcsp] for setting the CSP is via a custom HTTP
+header, which most HTTP reverse proxy programs allow.
+
+Beware that if you have a CSP set via both the HTTP and HTML headers
+that the two CSPs [merge](https://stackoverflow.com/a/51153816/142454),
+taking the most restrictive elements of each CSP. If you wish the proxy
+layer’s setting to completely override Fossil’s setting, you will need
+to combine that with one of the methods above to either remove the
+Fossil-provided CSP or to make Fossil provide a no-restrictions CSP
+which the front-end proxy can then tighten down.
+
+[pmcsp]: https://developers.google.com/web/fundamentals/security/csp/#the_meta_tag
+
+
+
+------------
+
+
+**Asides and Digressions:**
+
+1.  Fossil might someday switch to serving the “JavaScript” section of a
+    custom skin as a virtual text file, allowing it to be cached by the
+    browser, reducing page load times.
+
+2.  The stock Bootstrap skin *did* provide redundant CSP text from
+    Fossil 2.7 through Fossil 2.9, so setting the CSP via the higher
+    level methods did not work with that skin. We fixed this in Fossil
+    2.10, but if you selected the Bootstrap skin prior to that, you’re
+    now running on a *copy* of it stored in your repo settings table, so
+    the change to the stock version of the skin won’t affect that repo
+    automatically. You will have to either merge the diffs in with your
+    local changes or revert to the stock version of the skin.
+
+
+[cs]:    ./customskin.md
+[csp]:   https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/CSP
+[de]:    https://dopiaza.org/tools/datauri/index.php
+[xss]:   https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cross-site_scripting
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